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Summary findings
McMahon recommends using more quantitative  McMahon recommends that all technical assistance be
economic analysis in appraising technical assistance loans  classified according to the methodology suitable for its
and loan components.  appraisal and evaluation. In cases in which little or no
After giving a brief history of technical assistance and  quantitative analysis is used, the staff officer can and
the problems commonly associated with it, he describes  should provide a justification - in which case it should
classifications of technical assistance, proposes a new  still be possible to conceptualize the problem in
typology to be used for project appraisal, suggests  economic terms. Essential technical assistance should be
methods for screening projects, and discusses different  included when calculating the economic rate of return on
levels of economic analysis. He shows how the typology  a project. When technical assistance is exciuded from this
and economic analysis could be applied to 40 projects in  calculation, a strong justification for such assistance
the Europe and Central Asia region.  should be given or it should be omitted from the project.
Although some of the suggested approaches are  In his sample McMahon estimates that about 80
sophisticated and demanding, much of it relies on fairly  percent of the technical assistance in investment projects
simple techniques. McMahon estimates that roughly 60  was not essential for project implementation.  In the 12
percent  of the technical assistance in his sample was  projects for which an economic rate of return was
suitable for quantitative analysis.  calculated in the appraisal, the technical assistance was
Using four case studies, he demonstrates how  not included in the estimate - even though 53 percent
quantitative  economic analysis could be used more  of this technical assistance was deemed necessary to the
frequently in the appraisal process.  project.
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The primary objective of this report is to explore the scope and make concrete
recommendations for applying more economic analysis, especially of a quantitative nature, in the
a priori evaluation (or appraisal) of technical assistance loans and the technical assistance
component of other loans.  To meet this objective we begin with a brief history of technical
assistance, focusing on the problems that it has encountered and the World Bank response to
these difficulties.  In Part II of the document we describe different classifications of technical
assistance and propose an alternative typology which could be used for project appraisal.  A
range of different methodologies and suggestions for screening projects are also included in this
section.  In Part III we look at 40 projects from the ECA region, discuss the methodologies
actually used in their appraisals, and see how they fit in the proposed typology.  Four of these
projects are then analyzed in greater depth and recommendations are made on different
methodologies which could have been used in the appraisal process.  Part IV contains the
conclusions and recommendations.  While the examples and specific recommendations mostly
concern the World Bank, we believe that the observations and insights may be relevant and
useful for all agencies which fund and provide technical assistance.
Part I:  Technical  Assistance:  A Brief History'
This section begins with a discussion of the varying definitions of technical assistance
and what it actually includes.  This is followed by a presentation of the amounts of TA given by
donor, recipient countries, regions, activities, and number of personnel involved in delivery.
Growth paths and trends in TA are discussed. The third part of this section reviews the major
benefits and critiques of TA.  Finally, the section ends with a description of the guidelines used
for selecting and designing TA in the World Bank, with similar, albeit briefer, descriptions of the
process in GTZ and USAID given in Appendix II.
I(a): Definitions
1 The reader who is quite familiar  with the literature  on technical  assistance  may want to go directly  to Part II."Technical assistance is defined as the transfer or adaptation of ideas, knowledge,
practices, technologies, or skills to foster economic development. The purposes of Bank
technical assistance are classified as follows:  (a) Policy development, (b) Institutional
development, (c) Capacity building, and (d) Project or programme support."
This definition for technical assistance from the World Bank (1991  a) report of the
technical assistance review task force is similar, if somewhat more compact, to definitions given
by other agencies with one qualification. Many agencies call the (a), (b), and (c) above technical
cooperation and only include (d) (or a variation thereof) under the rubric technical assistance.
That is, they distinguish between activities whose main contribution is to design or implement a
given project or programme and those which are primarily trying to increase the level of
knowledge, skills, technological comprehension, or productive aptitudes of residents of a
developing country.  In this report we shall use the all-encompassing World Bank definition of
technical assistance - also used by AID and CIDA - unless otherwise noted. 2
With regards to types of TA, the most commonly used distinction is between free-
standing TA and project related TA. Project or investment related TA is meant to support the
execution of a capital project.  Free-standing TA is anything else, although it is usually related to
policy reform, institutional development, or capacity building.  Unfortunately, many donors do
not statistically differentiate the two, so it is difficult to determnine  what portion of TA falls under
each broad category. 3
The question of what is actually counted as TA, versus capital assistance, is a more
difficult one.  In general, however, the following rules of thumb apply. Large capital projects
and feasibility studies are not included.  However, specific training components attached to large
capital projects are TA.  On the other hand, small capital projects associated with a free-standing
TA, such as renovating a building or supplying computers, are generally included in TA.
Unfortunately, some agencies do not make any statistical distinction between TA and capital
assistance and others just refer to the  financing of personnel (or "experts") as TA and anything
else as capital assistance. 4 Nevertheless, our analysis in section III will focus on projects for
which the above distinctions are made.
I(b): Trends in Technical Assistance
While we have some data on technical assistance provided by the World Bank, we only
have detailed data on technical assistance in the form of grants.  Total current dollar TA grants
2  Berg  (1993:  42-47)  goes  into  considerable  detail  on the  definitions  of TA  and TC used  by different  agencies.
3  A differentiation  is often  made between  "soft" and "hard" TA, where the latter is for specific  investment  needs
and the former for more general purposes,  including  institutional  development. Most free-standing  TA is of the
soft variety, while TA attached  to projects  may be of either sort.
4  Berg (1993: 48-52) discusses  the distinction  between  capital assistance  and technical  assistance  in detail.
2provided to developing countries, excluding the forner  communist countries (or current
transition countries), was $US 1.0b in 1970, $US 4.5b in 1980, $US 9.5b in 1990, and $US 11.3b
in 1993.5 As a percentage of total ODA, these amounts were 23 percent, 27 percent, 29 percent,
and 39 percent, respectively. As these amounts do not include loans for TA, they understate the
total share of TA in ODA.
Substantial TA from OECD countries to the fornerly  socialist transition countries only
began in 1991. If we include these amounts, the total grant TA for 1993 is $US 13.6b versus
$US 11.3b if excluded.  Therefore, 17 percent of TA went to transition economies in 1993 from
less than 3 percent only 4 years earlier. African countries have taken the lion's  share of TA, with
about two-thirds of this portion going to Sub-Saharan Africa. While Africa's  share has generally
been greater than 50 percent, the 'rise'  of transition countries has brought this amount closer to
40 percent in recent years.  While we expected to find TA being increasingly dominated by
African and transition countries, this had not happened by 1994, with their combined share being
similar to Africa's percentage of TA in the 1980s.
At the beginning of 1996 the World Bank portfolio had 136 free-standing TA loans, with
an average size of $US 20m,  and TA components in 1300 other projects which ranged from $US
200,000 to $US 50m.  Another $US 450m of TA also goes through grants and trust funds each
year. Note that 41 percent of TA component lending in 1995 went to only 5 countries:
Argentina, Russia, China, Mexico, and India.  In the fiscal year 1994-95 there were $US 812m of
new free-standing TA loans. 6
I(c):  Benefits and Critiques of Technical Assistance: A Review
Technical assistance can be used to fill gaps for specific knowledge in development
projects, assist in policy reform, and, most importantly, develop local capacity to undertake tasks
by themselves either through institutional development or capacity building. While gap-filling
TA was once quite common, the ability to foster self-reliance is now considered the main goal of
TA.  In the context of TA, Cassen (1994: 165) specifies 3 dimensions of self-reliance:  (i) to
determine knowledge needs that cannot adequately be met domestically, identify where in other
countries such needs may be met, know how to acquire this knowledge, and know how to adapt
and use it at home; (ii) the ability to undertake domestic research, problem-solving and policy
formation; and (iii) the ability to sustain these capacities, which involves the institutional
capacities for training successive generations of scientists, technicians, and managers. 7
S  Berg  (1993:  73) calculates  that  real  TA grants  to Sub-Saharan  Africa  grew  by 44 from 1975  to 1989. Given
that the African share of TA did not change substantially  over that  period in our larger, undeflated  data set, this
figure can be used as a rough approximation  of the total real growth of TA in the period.
6  These  figures  come  from  Operations  Evaluation  Department  (1996).
7  Note that in the original 1986  edition  of his book, the chapter  on technical  cooperation  was written by Robert
Muscat. This chapter is substantially  unchanged  in the 1994  edition.
3However, despite these praiseworthy goals, technical assistance in virtually all donor or
lender institutions has come under a barrage of criticism in the last 15 years from donors,
recipients, and independent observers alike.  Perhaps the most distressing aspect of the criticism
is that general evaluations of technical assistance written in 1995 read much the same as
evaluations written in 1983.8 While it would take a book (or at least a thick monograph) to
address this problem in full, we will go through some of the most consistent criticisms of
technical assistance. 9
The first group of problems of TA comes from the fact that it is often donor (or supply)
driven. For various reasons, discussed below, the donor agency wants to provide free-standing
TA or add on a TA component to an investment project.  It is usually but not always (especially
from the World Bank) free, and the recipients take it for that reason or simply because if they
want the investment component, they must take it. In addition, free-standing TA often includes
substantial equipment support, so the reluctant recipient takes the expert services out of need or
desire for the material goods.
There are many potential problems with donor driven TA but by far the most important is
that there may be little recipient commitment.  Such commitment is particularly essential in the
case of institutional development, as otherwise when the foreign experts leave there will be little
or no follow-up and the probability of long-term impact is virtually nil.  All evaluations of TA
concur on the fact that borrower ownership is a prerequisite for success.
The reasons for donor driven TA vary from the well-meaning to the suspect.  Often it is
realized that without significant institutional development, the probability of success of other
initiatives, donor driven or otherwise, is very small. At the other extreme, the TA may be based
on the wish to provide work for national consultants, who in turn put pressure on their own
govermments  to provide this type of foreign aid.  In project related TA there may be a wish to
keep closer control over the investment or an inability to locate competent local personnel.
However, the criticisms of donor driven TA are more likely the result of the inadequacy
of much of the TA rather than the underlying motives.  Its frequent failure begins with poor
identification and design of the project, a problem which has increased as TA has become
"softer" on average.  This problem begins with the development of projects without either an
institutional development strategy or sectoral analysis to act as guides.  A recurring criticism of
Bank TA (which would also apply to most other donor agencies) is the lack of expertise on
8  A review  of a progression  of World  Bank  documents  evaluating  technical  assistance  can  leave  the  reader  with  a
feeling  of being suspended  in time.  See, for example,  Lethem  and Cooper (1983), WAN Task Force (1986),
AFTPS (1989), and Jayarajah  and Branson  (1995).
9 The following  is based largely, but not exclusively,  on evaluations  of World Bank  technical  assistance.
However, the materials  that we have read on technical  assistance  of other agencies  suggests  that the experience  of
the Bank is quite generalizable.
4institutional issues within the Bank. 10 Consequently, objectives are often unclear, terms of
reference for consultants are vague, feasibility is questionable, and follow-up under
implementation is half-hearted at best.  The capacity of the recipient to undertake the project, or
more importantly, to follow-up once the experts have left, is often addressed in a cursory manner.
Once underway the lack of proper supervision and/or monitoring  is a common complaint in all
reviews of Bank TA that we have seen.  It is likely that, as in most aid agencies, career
development in the Bank is more closely linked to what gets off the ground rather than how it
flies later, by which time it is often someone else's responsibility. 11 To counteract this poor
incentive structure, in the case of TA loans Klitgaard (1996) argues in favor of a shared
conditionality, where repayment depends on the success of the project.
Two criticisms in particular stand out in the discussion of the low success rate of TA.
First, inadequate attention is paid to training.  Consultants are rarely chosen for their pedagogical
skills and usually are much more concerned with fulfilling their technical obligations rather than
training successors. In addition, the persons chosen to be trained are often the wrong ones.  This
is particularly the case in the expert-counterpart model, where the latter is someone from low
down in the ranks or outside of the organization who will have no decision making
responsibilities once the expert leaves.  Second, and related to the first, the short-term goals of
operational support are usually given precedence over the long-term goals of institutional
development.  In fact, the report by the Operations Evaluation Department (1989) of the Bank
argues that TA for institutional development should not be attached to SALs or SECALs as they
operate on different time horizons and the former will surely suffer under the pressure to
implement the latter.
Of course, there are also numerous problems or obstacles on the recipient side.  Even if
the will is there, the capacity is often lacking.  And if the capacity - in the sense of human capital
- is there, the institutional structure often is not.  Of particular importance is the low motivation
of the civil service due to poor working conditions and salaries.  The latter is partially remedied
by salary supplements but these can create more problems than they solve due to the jealousies
and friction that they can generate, not to mention corruption in selection procedures.  General
problems of a poorly functioning civil service are similarly "resolved" by the creation of project
implementation units.  However, the usefulness of these enclave like structures seem to rarely
survive long once the foreign experts leave.
10 In his review of institutional  development  in World Bank  projects,  Paul (1990: 37) states: "The operational
staff  whose forte is sector technology  and economics  had an edge  in diagnosing  and advising  on these
[implementing]  agency-related  institutional  problems. The wider institutional  analysis  and design  associated  with
sectoral  ID issues, however,  are less often  within their competence  especially  if they are relatively  inexperienced.
For example, the redesign of the management  of ministry  functions  and inter-ministerial  linkages,  sector-wide
identification  of institutional  altematives  for service  delivery, redistribution  of authority  and responsibility  between
levels  of government,  and the reorientation  of the bureaucracy  following  deregulation  involve  different  actors,
interest groups and inter-organizational  behavior  problems  which they may not have  been exposed  to in many
cases. Thus, there is a clear mismatch  between  the nature  of ID issues  being addressed  in recent projects  and the
skills and experience  available  in the country  departments  to deal with  them."
Berg (1993) stresses  this point with regards to the Bank.
5Recipients often look on TA as free, not fully understanding its true cost.  Most TA
grants require direct contributions of the recipient of office space and supplies, support staff, and
some professional staff. In addition, there are often significant indirect costs associated with the
time of senior management in negotiating and implementing TA projects.  These can be very
important if the government is the recipient of a large number of uncoordinated TA projects from
many donors, as is often the case. In addition, usually more than half of the TA funds go to the
salaries and benefits of foreign experts, and it is often questionable whether their contribution
equals their costs.  This is a significant problem for the recipient if the TA is given on a loan
basis. 12 It also brings up the question of whether or not sufficient attention is being paid to the
use (or development) of local consultants.
Some commentators -Mosley (1992), Berg (1993) - stress that a fundamental problem of
TA is a lack of markets or two separate markets.  Mosley (1992: 83) notes:
"At present the market for technical assistance is characterised by an enormous gap
between need and demand - that is, those who benefit from training or advice in developing
countries are not, as a rule, those who pay for those services. In such an environment, the
supplier is chasing two separate markets - the ultimate beneficiary who 'needs' the technical
assistance and the sponsor who finances it.  But neither of these parties, as we have seen, is
supporting an evaluation effort of a type which will identify which TC suppliers are meeting a
country's development needs in a cost-effective manner and which are not; and as a consequence
of this absence of signals, the market for TC is characterised by extreme rigidity, with many
training courses having been given for 20 years, at sponsors' request, in substantially the same
form.  Only if evaluation processes come to supply better information concerning where the
critical skill gaps in a country are located and how they can most effectively be filled will aid
resources in this area be deployed in anything more than a haphazard way."
Similarly, in the case of a TA loan the ministry receiving the assistance is rarely the one
that actually pays for it.  Therefore, it is rarely refused, especially if much needed equipment is
part of the package.  Berg (1993: 181) proposes some type of system in which recipient
ministries (and countries in the case of grants) are forced to pay part of the cost of TA.  The more
general point is that for TA to be more effective, it is likely that some type of market mechanism
will have to be introduced so that both the donors and recipients will be more aware of its costs
and benefits.
Finally, many of the problems of TA begin at the beginning.  It is rare that a TA project
or component is funded based on in-depth economic analysis. While there are many difficulties
with the use of cost-benefit analysis (to be discussed in Part II of this report), it is rare that other
procedures such as cost-effectiveness, counterfactual analysis, and alternative projects or project
12  It also can have a negative  effect on the behavior  of local civil servants  who have to work with foreigners
earning many multiples  of their incomes, and who, moreover, disrupt  their organizational  structures.
6design are seriously considered.  Even the use of qualitative economic analysis is quite limited,
and it is rare that a full conceptualization of the project in economic terms is undertaken.
I(d).  Guidelines for TA Selection and Design
We examined the guidelines for TA selection and design of three institutions primarily to
see if there were any standard procedures on the use of quantitative analysis.  While in general
there was not a great deal, it is worthwhile to look in some detail at the guidelines of the World
Bank to see how some of the criticisms in the last section are being met and where further
improvements may be necessary. In Appendix II we have brief descriptions of the guidelines for
two other institutions -USAID and the GTZ.
If the guidelines and procedures outlined in the Handbook on Technical Assistance of the
Operations Policy Department of the World Bank were followed to the letter, many of the
problems discussed in the last sub-section would be resolved.  This Handbook contains a candid
look at many of the difficulties of every aspect of TA and makes detailed recommendations as to
how they can be avoided.  When coupled with the "Performance Indicators for Technical
Assistance Operations," also by the Operations Policy Department (1996), the Task Manager has
a comprehensive set of procedures for greatly enhancing the probability of successful design and
implementation of a TA project.'3
However, at the risk of being considered unappreciative of the excellence of these
documents, we would like to point out two problem areas. The first potential difficulty is the
amount of staff time that strict (or near) adherence to these guidelines would entail.  Only time
and experience will answer that question but it does not seem impossible that it would double or
triple the Bank staff time for a typical institutional development TA project.  Then one must
consider whether the better quality project justifies this extra time.  More importantly, the
incentive structure within the Bank must also reflect the reallocation of time towards more
intense monitoring and fewer projects per staff officer.  Alternatively, it could be argued that
what is needed is to distill some rules of thumb from the guidelines which could quickly
eliminate many projects.  (For example, is there a serious recipient commitment to the project?)
Second, while these documents contain a wealth of information on design and
implementation, they do not give much advice on selection. That is, once the area of
intervention is chosen, adherence to these guidelines and procedures should greatly increase the
probability of success, but there is not much advice on how to determine which of several
alternative projects should proceed or whether any project should proceed at all or which of
several alternative ways of reaching given objectives should be followed.  Such decisions are
implicitly left to professional (qualitative) judgement.
13  Appendix  L.A  contains  some  of the  main  recommendations  of the  Handbook  to minimnize  the difficulties  noted
above.
7The above comments aside, a judicious following of the guidelines in the Handbook
would eliminate many alternative designs or even entire projects on the grounds of, for example,
lack of borrower commitment or capacity. While one does not find an explicit definition of the
fundamentals in the Handbook, these could include: (a) Adequate assessment of borrower's
needs; (b) Country commitment both to project and to follow-up; (c) Adequate competency and
skill levels both during project and in follow-up; (d) Adequate legal and paralegal system for the
project's needs; (e) Satisfactory incentives for civil servants; (f) Clearly explained connections
between inputs, outputs, and outcomes; and (g) Adequate physical and financial resources from
both the donor/lender and recipient side.
Nevertheless, if the fundamentals are present in sufficient degree to go ahead with a
project, our reservations on Bank staff time and incentives and project selection still hold.  More
importantly, in some countries - especially in Africa where the bulk of ID/TA is concentrated - it
is likely that not all of the fundamentals will be in place or they will be weak.  Does this imply
that no TA projects should go ahead in such countries?1 4 This brings us to another important
question:  What does risk analysis mean or how is it undertaken in the context of ID/TA when
there is no cost-benefit feasibility study?  We argue below that if cost-benefit and cost-
effectiveness are definitely not possible, risk analysis may have to be undertaken using the
results of similar projects in the recipient country or similar countries.
Part II:  Technical Assistance:  Evaluation
This part begins with a general discussion of institutional development, due to its
growing importance among TA activities.  We then look at a number of classifications of
technical assistance that have been proposed by others.  In section three we construct a typology
of TA projects and identify relevant methodologies, both quantitative and qualitative.  The next
section distinguishes between loan and grant TA. In section five we suggest a priori
considerations for screening TA activities in order to weed out those unlikely to be justified
using economic analysis.
11(a): Institutional Development (ID)
Any discussion of technical assistance inevitably turns to institutional development.  At
times the terms are even used interchangeably. While we believe that ID is only one of many
types of technical assistance, it is increasingly the dominant type. In our review of 40 ECA
projects in section III(a), we classified ID as the main type of TA in 21 cases.  In value terms we
classified 71 percent of the TA as institutional development.  From an evaluation perspective, a
priori and ex post, this could be considered unfortunate, as it is one of the most difficult types of
TA to analyze quantitatively.  In fact, many analysts say that it is often impossible to quantify
14 Alexander  (1990:4), in his response  to Operations  Evaluation  Department  (1989), puts this dilemma  quite
graphically:  "the discussion of absorptive capacity is a bit of a chicken and egg problem - if a country has the
capacity to handle TA well, it generally needs less TA.  The real problem is how can the Bank effectively work
through TA and other instruments in countries that have very weak absorptive capacities."
8and qualitative judgements must be used. 15 Nevertheless, we believe that there are many
different sub-categories of institutional development. In our typology of TA activities in section
II(c) we divide ID into a number of categories, some of which we believe to be quite amenable to
quantification.  Before we move on to these classifications, however, we think that a brief
discussion of ID in more general terms is helpful in order to have a clearer picture of the
problems it engenders, from both implementation and evaluation perspectives.
We will not attempt to review the voluminous literature on institutional economics, but
instead we hope to highlight a few key points which in turn will illuminate some of the problems
faced by the ex ante and ex post evaluators.1 6 The consensus among economists is that
institutions exist primarily for two reasons:  (a) to lower transaction costs; and (b) to act as focal
points for collective action due to the free rider problem.  The quintessential institution is the free
market for the exchange of goods and services. From a donor or development bank perspective
institutional development is largely concerned with making the free market work better (often by
a clearer allocation of property rights) or strengthening the public institutions which are
necessary due to high transaction costs and/or free rider problems.'7 Often it can have both goals
simultaneously, as, for example, in the case of judicial reform.
The problems of appraisal and evaluation are quickly apparent.  How can one quantify a
more efficiently functioning market?  Indicators such as changes in growth of GNP or specific
sectors are generally going to be much too crude to have any significance.  Similarly, the fact
that one finds public institutions in cases of imperfect markets implies that they primarily exist in
situations where it is difficult to put a price or value on their output.  While in some cases
shadow prices can be used, in many others, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there are no
obvious output measures.  In such situations the best an evaluator can probably do is determine
whether this output fulfills the objectives of the ministry and does so at least cost.
The water becomes even murkier if we agree with Arkadie (1989: 169) when he says:
"One is left with the awkward conclusion that the public sector is in part the residual legatee of
activities that do not lend themselves to effective institutional performance."  This statement is
closely related to Israel's (1987) hypothesis of specificity and competition (discussed in more
detail below) in which he argues that across countries the public institutions which have the most
specific functions and tasks and which face the most competition, either directly or indirectly, are
those which perform better.  This suggests that public institutions which are more akin to
industrial firms - and whose inclusion in the public sector is debatable -may be the only ones
15  See, for example,  Operations  Policy  Department  (1996:  143-44)  for a discussion  of the difficulties  of
quantifying  TA for ID.
16 For overviews  of institutional  development  from different  perspectives,  see Arkadie (1989), North (1990),
Eggertsson  (1990), or Lin and Nugent (1995).
17  Of course, it is likely that TA has often gone to strengthen public institutions which would not have existed if
the state had let the market do its job,  but this is probably less and less the case given the global emphasis on the
renewed importance of free markets.
9that work well. It is not clear,  as Arkadie  (1989: 169)  argues,  that such institutions  are
appropriate  objects of external  assistance.
In the analysis  below of the ECA projects  we make a distinction  between  institutional
development  where  the output can be measured  either  in value or quantity  terms and  those where
neither  is possible. In essence  the former  can be considered  high specificity  institutions  while the
latter are low specificity  institutions. Our (admittedly  very crude) analysis  shows  that 35 percent
of institutional  development  funds  went to institutions  of low specificity  which did not face
competitive  pressures. Appraisal  and evaluation  in such cases  can be exceptionally  difficult,
especially  if it is clear that no private sector  institution  would  fill the void left by the absence  of
the public  institution. One  may be left in a situation  in which it is necessary  to make the difficult
analysis  of the situation  of the country  with and without  the institution. Of course,  the fall back
situation  for evaluation  purposes  could again  be whether  the institution  is cost effective  in its
delivery.1 8
Finally,  there is the issue of path dependence,  emphasized  by Bardhan  (1989) and  North
(1989)  and others. An institution  may  persist for a long  time and even  appear  to be relatively
efficient  but it may  be the wrong institution. That  is, it developed  out of an institution  which  was
forned because  it suited  particular  interests  at a given  time. However,  if one could start from
scratch  right now, it is likely  that an alternative  (or no) institution  would  be selected. From an
evaluator's  perspective,  the possibility  of path dependence  makes  her task all the more difficult  as
it suggests  that even cost effectiveness  may not be a proper tool of analysis. While  we will not
discuss  this point to any extent  in this paper, a strong  analysis  of whether  the institution  is
properly  in the public or private sector  should  address  this question  adequately.' 9
II(b):  Technical  Assistance  Classifications
It was noted in the first section  of part I that technical  assistance  is typically  differentiated
between  project related  and free standing,  and, in fact, it is rare that any data exists that goes
beyond this simple  dichotomy. However,  there have been  numerous  more ambitious  attempts  to
classify  different  types  of TA. We shall  review  some  of these and determine  whether  any are
more suitable  to our ultimate  goal  of classifying  TA projects according  to their suitability  for
quantitative  analysis.
Berg (1993: 56-57)  suggests  5 possible  ways of classifying  TA, the last of which comes
from a World Bank document. The first distinction  is between  'hard'  and 'soft' overall  objectives,
where  the former  is on a specific,  concrete  task with a measurable  output and the latter  on
18 An interesting  exarnple,  given the institutional  development  effort that is being made in this area, is whether a
Central Bank is needed or not.  Some countries  have toyed with  the idea of making  the US dollar  their official
currency. The greatest difficulty  in appraisal  may be to put a value on national  sovereignty.
19 Devarajan  et al (1996) discuss  the need for a careful examination  of the role of the public  sector in the context
of the public expenditure  review.
10institutional and human resource development. While based on different criteria, in practice this
distinction is very close to his second classification, which is the standard project-related versus
free-standing.  Nevertheless, our task at hand is to show that different types of 'soft' TA, free-
standing or otherwise, are amenable to quantitative analysis. The third classification is from the
donor viewpoint and differentiates between skills transfer, control or management of project
resources, and TA as a catalyst to breathe life into a dormant project or institution.  The fourth
distinguishes TA by the type of personnel; ie performner,  substitute, teacher or trainer, or
mobilizer.  Finally, the fifth (World Bank (1991b)) classification consists of foreign experts or
high-level policy advisers, gap-fillers, gatekeepers or project managers, and institutional twins.
In addition, Berg (1993: 61-62) lists seven different elements of institutional
development, which also could be considered a typology of the goals of  ID/TA projects:
(i) changing incentives to induce behavioral changes; (ii) enhancing skills by training and
education; (iii) strengthening organizational performance; (iv) reforming procedures or systems
of coordination between organizations; (v) increasing financial capabilities by more effective
resource mobilization; (vi) nurturing societal supports - for example, by encouraging formation
of user groups, political reforms that bring greater transparency and accountability, and greater
participation of wage eamers in determination of their conditions of employment; and (vii)
cultivating new norms and values.
Cassen (1994: 143) lists 8 different types of TA:  "(i) pre-feasibility and feasibility
studies for capital projects; (ii) engineering design and construction oversight for capital projects;
(iii) research; (iv) institution building projects (which may be free-standing or combined with
capital projects); (v) policy studies; (vi) individual free-standing fellowships (that is, not part of
an institution building or capital project); (vii) individual expert services (consultancies;
seconded expatriates); and (viii) short-terrn training (seminars, study and observation tours,
equipment familiarization)."
In a Bank document Lethem and Cooper (1983: 37-40) distinguish between 4 types of
TA, based on the role of the foreign and local personnel. These are:  (a)  performer or substitute
model, (b) prescriptive or expert adviser model, (c) counterpart-adviser model, and (d)
collaborative model.
In another Bank study, AFTPS (1989: 14), TA was classified into four categories:  "(a)
advisory services for supervision, implementation and engineering; (b) feasibility and other
technical studies; (c) consultant services for management, economic and financial policy
analysis, sectoral studies, organizational and institutional review studies, development of MIS,
surveys, research, and collection of other statistics; and (d) training."
Operations Policy Department (1996: 3) of the Bank differentiates free-standing technical
assistance loans by objectives:  (a) public sector capacity building, economic management, tax
administration, judicial infrastructure improvement; (b) parastatal reform; (c) sectoral
management; (d) privatization; and (e) environmental management.
11While he does not explicitly define a typology, the work of Israel (1987) on institutional
development implicitly contains one.  He hypothesizes (with some data support) that the major
predictors of the success of an institutional development project are the specificity of the
functions and the competition to which they are exposed.  Consequently, one finds much more
variation across sectors than across countries when looking at the success of institutional
development projects.  While it is the case that, for example, projects in East Asia are more
successful than in sub-Saharan Africa, the similarity of the sectoral rankings in each subset are
much more striking.  The reasons behind such results, he argues,  are that sectors across countries
tend to be under similar conditions with respect to both specificity and competition, where
specificity is defined as (roughly) the degree to which the objectives, methods, and results of an
activity can be defined and, correspondingly, rewarded. High specificity activities usually lend
themselves much more easily to competitive pressures, both internal and external to the
organization.
11(c):  A Technical Assistance Typologv
IIc.i  Criteria  for Establishing  Technical  Assistance  Categories
Almost all discussions of TA speak of the difficulties of quantitative analysis (especially
when it is for institutional development or capacity building), although more recent documents
express a need for some attempt.  The Handbook of the Operations Policy Department (1993:
143-44) makes a plea for more use of quantitative analysis but concludes:  "In the final analysis,
judgement serves as the best guide to IDTA."  Other observers, such as Cassen (1994: 171) see
the evaluation problem as being closely linked to the general problem of analysis of TA:  "There
is a striking weakness in the intellectual underpinning of institution building, human
development, and associated TC compared with the theoretical and quantitative tools used to
plan physical investment."
Nevertheless, we believe that an increased use of quantitative economic analysis in TA
appraisal is not only possible, as will be argued below, but would significantly enhance the
quality of the TA.  A clear exposition of the costs and benefits of a project is beneficial even if
all of the numbers cannot be filled in as it brings out all the elements which will be affected by
the project.  Similarly, analysis of the fiscal impact will not only clarify the possible effects on
the government budget constraint, but it will also elucidate the division of projected costs and
benefits between the public and private sectors.  Finally, the relatively simple chore of
conceptualizing the TA in economic terms can help prevent inconsistencies between the tasks to
be undertaken and the project objectives, as well as among the tasks and objectives themselves.
For the most part it is not very difficult to measure the costs of a TA project, as they
largely consist of the standard items such as personnel, equipment, communications and supplies,
and office space. Some of these are usually provided by the recipient, and there may be some
challenge to obtaining their actual value (or opportunity cost), but this should not be
insurmountable.  The most difficult measurement on the cost side is likely to be the opportunity
cost of senior officials in the recipient country in the negotiation and implementation stages.  If
our guesstimate with respect to the increase in Bank staff time and resources needed to comply
12with the guidelines and procedures on TA is credible, proper estimation of these costs could also
be essential in determining the "profitability" of a TA project. 20
Nevertheless, the true challenge in both a priori and ex post evaluation of TA projects is
on the benefit side.  In practice, it is rare that any attempt is made at quantitative analysis in
project appraisal and it is also uncommon in ex-post evaluation.  Thus, it seems likely that the
most important prerequisite for a typology of TA projects, given our ultimate purpose, is the
measurability of outputs and the ability to assign a monetary amount if measurable. For
example, an institution created to train mining engineers has an expected measurable output to
which a monetary value can be placed; ie the present value of the expected increase in their
earnings.  Funding for academic research has a measurable output -number of recipients,
publications, etc - but it is difficult to put a monetary value to it.  Support for strengthening the
operations of a central bank may not have either. 21
Even  when a measurable output exists, it may have little value as a quantitative indicator.
This is particularly true for training courses where the quality of the course and the selection of
the participants is often much more important than the turnover.  Accordingly, one must be
cautious when assigning values to outputs which have only a tenuous link to impacts. 22
IIc.ii  Categories of Technical Assistance
In total we use five categories: investment project, general capacity building, institutional
development - output permitting valuation, institutional development - measurable output, and
institutional development -non-measurable output.  To construct these categories we applied the
main criteria discussed in the last sub-section -the ability to value and/or quantify output - to the
typology given by Cassen, referred to above. 23
Investment project TA includes his first two categories, feasibility studies and engineering
design and construction oversight for capital projects, as well as short-term training needed for
the implementation of a specific investment project. Note that the latter is not equivalent to all
short-termn  training found in investment projects, as a great deal of the TA found in actual
20  In many institutions the opportunity costs  on the donor side are far from clear.  In general little attempt is
made  to cost  out the  staff,  supplies,  and overhead  time  devoted  to projects  unless  there  is another  donor  involved.
In these  instances  rules  of thumb  are  usually  used  which  may  have  no relation  to the actual  costs  incurred  for
individual  projects,  even  if on average  they  are  close.
21  These examples are only for illustrative purposes, as it is easy to think of caveats to all of them.
22  Moore  (1995:  39) is more  caustic  on this  point,  referring  to training  as the 'default  mode'  of institutional
development.
23  Cassen's category  "individual expert services"  is excluded from this mapping as it is, in effect, captured within
all of his other categories.
13projects is not necessary for implementation. 24 All investment project TA can and should be
incorporated in the determination of the expected rate of return of the investment.
General capacity building TA is at the opposite end of the spectrum from investment
project TA.  It consists of research, policy studies, short-term training, and free-standing
fellowships.  However, we only include the first three if they are not part of an institution
building project and also, in the case of short-term training, not necessary for implementation of
an investment project.
General capacity building is typically very difficult to appraise using quantitative
economic analysis.  Research is one of the most difficult areas to appraise.  The typical method is
to estimate the number of domestic and intemational publications.  These could perhaps be
monetized by estimating expected salary increases to researchers with more publications,
although this would entail a number of difficult assumptions, such as the value of a publication in
journal "x" relative to journal "y".  Policy studies may be even more difficult to appraise than
research as their importance depends on who they influence as much as their content.  If they are
not published - as is usually the case except for internal use - it is difficult to ascribe an
independent value to them.  Individual free-standing fellowships are a considerable amount of
donor aid and presumably can be evaluated based on expected increases in income.  However,
this calculation becomes much more difficult (and controversial) when the large amount of brain
drain that they often entail is included.
Short-term training for general capacity building can be subdivided into tangible, market-
specific skills such as computer training and more abstract, conceptual knowledge such as
courses on structural adjustment. The return to conceptual knowledge is much more difficult to
determine, partly due to its nature and partly due to the persons likely to be taking the training.
They will generally be part of the public sector, often in middle management or higher, and their
human capital will consist of a number of characteristics. It is likely to be difficult or impossible
to sort out the effects of one training course on the return to their human capital.
Institution building TA has become the dominant form of non-project related TA.  Given
its importance, we have sub-divided Cassen's category into three sub-categories, partially based
upon the concepts of specificity and competition as defined by Israel (1987).  One can first
differentiate between projects which are targeted on activities which have a monetary value or
are easily monetized versus those which do not - for example, reform of the electric company
versus the Central Bank.  In the latter group it is then possible to further distinguish between
projects centered on easily measurable outputs (although difficult to value) and those whose
results are less tangible or, as is more often the case, difficult to disentangle from a number of
24  In Part III we estimate  that about 80 percent of the TA in non-TA  projects  in our sample  was not necessary  for
implementation. Of course, the next question  is why is the TA there in the first place if it is not necessary  for
implementation. We will address  that question  in the conclusions  and recommendations.
14reforms and other developments. 25 For example, the output of privatization projects can be
measured relatively easily (although it may be difficult to value) while the output from a wide-
ranging project such as Ukranian Institutional Reform is very difficult to quantify.  In sum,
institutional development can be separated into activities whose output permits valuation, those
which have a measurable output but which cannot be valued, and those which do not have either
feature.  In addition to Cassen's institution building category, these three categories will include
part of his policy studies, research, and short-term training.
We would like to emphasize that while it is clear that a great deal of institutional
development is capacity building, the category of general capacity building only includes items
which are not specifically part of an institutional development project. 26 Typically, economic
analysis of a general capacity building project would focus directly on the return to human
capital while economic analysis of an institution building project would focus on the
performance of the institution.
IIc.iii  Appraisal Methodologies
There are a number of different methodologies that can be used to appraise technical
assistance.  Those which we believe to be most suitable for World Bank projects are, moving
from most quantitative to most qualitative, cost-benefit analysis, cost effectiveness, fiscal impact,
lessons from previous projects, qualitative economic analysis, and professional judgement.
While the concept of cost-benefit analysis is well-known, if often difficult to undertake,
that of cost effectiveness is often less clear.  It is undertaken when costs can be measured
although benefits are difficult to value.  To be meaningful the outputs must be quantified before
and after. 27 In essence, one is asking whether the good or service is being delivered in the most
efficient manner.  However, it is often difficult to have benchmarks or alternatives, especially in
the case of transition economies.  One can begin by costing out different ways of production
and/or provision.  For example, while it may be difficult to value the benefits of a health project,
there will often be some estimate of reduced morbidity and mortality.  These figures should be
compared with the cost of similar reductions with alternative health interventions.
Then one should ask the following two questions.  First, is it expected that the good or
service will be delivered at a lower cost than before the technical assistance?  Second, how will
25  Easily measurable outputs will often be related to what Israel (1987: 49) calls  "well-defined tasks"; that is,
tasks in which the worker  does not have much latitude over the content of the job.  For example,  in his typology
an airplane mechanic has a well-defimed task while an agricultural extension worker does not.
26  For exarnple, mass training of tax administrators would likely be part of an institutional development project
while a general scholarship competition would be included in general capacity building.  While institutional
development could be called (institution) specific capacity building, "institutional development" is the common
World Bank termrinology.
27  For example, delivery of pension cheques is likely to be subject to cost effectiveness analysis while delivery of
primnary  school education may not be, given the importance of quality.
15the average cost of the good or service compare with similar countries?  For example, wiL
administrative cost per unit of income tax collected be lower than previously and how will i
compare with the per unit cost in other countries?
At times it may be impossible to get a clear picture of cost effectiveness due to significant
changes in quality or multiple objectives. Nevertheless, given the budgetary problems facing
many borrowing countries, the fiscal  impact of the project may be an alternative measure of its
viability.  By fiscal impact, we simply mean the expected effect on the government's budget
balance. For example, in a country with a large fiscal deficit, tax reform may be more concerned
with increasing revenues than lowering administrative costs. Thus the anticipated fiscal impact
of the project would be more important than the cost effectiveness (defined as average
administrative cost per dollar of tax revenue). Note that the analysis of the fiscal impact of a
project could be as sophisticated as estimating the present value of the changes in revenues and
expenditures or as simple as estimates of the effects on the budget deficit in the short-term.  The
macroeconomic situation of the country will help determine the relevant time horizon.  In a
country with severe macroeconomic instability a project which looks quite attractive in the long-
term may have to be abandoned if the fiscal impact in the early years is negative. 28
We have already noted that cross-country comparisons can be used in the analysis of the
cost-effectiveness of a project.  In addition, ex-post results of other projects in the recipient
country or similar projects in other countries can be used in the appraisal process.  Although it is
becoming common practice in the Bank to use lessons from past experience, these could be
undertaken in a more rigorous manner.  First, when feasible, rates of return should be extracted
(or calculated) from previous similar projects and compared with the estimated rate of return for
the current project.  If these are significantly different, the onus should be on the project
appraiser to justify her calculations.  Even more important, in the case of non-quantifiable
projects which have had a history of failure either at the particular country level or at the similar
institutional level, the impetus should again be on the evaluator to explain in detail why this case
is "special" if it receives a positive appraisal. This explanation should go beyond statements such
as "lessons learned from previous projects are being taken into account" and provide a detailed
plan of ways in which past shortcomings will be overcome.
Finally, in some technical assistance projects it is genuinely difficult to measure outputs
either due to the nature of the assistance or the fact that it is part of a broad number of difficult to
disentangle measures. However, it will almost always be possible to conceptualize the problem
in economic terms.  In this manner the objectives of the project are at least put in a consistent
framework. Accordingly, at a minimum every project should include qualitative economic
analysis consisting of the conceptualization of the methods and objectives in order to verify their
internal consistency.  The go-ahead for the project would then be decided by professional
judgement,  supported by this qualitative economic analysis. We would suggest that an outside
28 Of course, this point will not be relevant  if there is a long grace period before repayment  begins  unless a
substantial  part of the project is funded  directly  by the loan recipient.
16independent analysis also be required for projects which are difficult to quantify and for which
there are few past projects with which to compare it.
IIc.iv  Economic Analysis of Technical Assistance Projects: A Typology
In our construction of a typology for economic analysis of TA projects, we use a grid
system.  On the vertical axis we move from the most quantitative to most qualitative techniques.
On the horizontal axis we have the type of project based on the measurability and/or
monetization of the objectives and impact.  This is illustrated in Table 1. Each square contains
"x", "xx", or is blank.  A blank square indicates that in general the methodology is inappropriate
for the type of project.  "x" represents what we believe to be an alternative methodology for the
type of project if the preferred methodology (or methodologies) cannot be undertaken due to data
limitations or cost constraints. It may also be used as a supportive role even when the preferred
methodology is feasible.  "xx" indicates what we believe will usually be the best methodology
for this type of project barring major data limitations.
On the vertical axis of each table we start with cost-benefit analysis, followed by cost-
effectiveness, fiscal impact, previous projects - quantitative, previous projects - qualitative, and
professional judgement.  On the horizontal axis of Table 1 the categories are investment project,
capacity building, and institutional development. The latter is subdivided into output permitting
valuation, measurable output, and non-measurable output.  Investment project includes all TA
which is necessary for the implementation of the  project.  These include pre-feasibility and
feasibility studies, engineering design and construction oversight, and short-term training for
what we referred to as market-specific skills (or what Israel might call well-defined tasks).
Capacity building includes training which is neither a crucial part of an investment project nor an
integral element of institutional development TA.  It also includes scholarships, research, and
policy studies, again if the latter are not part of institutional development TA. The different
categories of institutional development are as explained in IIc.ii above.
Note that we do not see this typology or our grading system as being definitive.  It was
constructed partially based on the selection of projects that we examine in section III and would
likely need to be modified to fit particular regions.  Our main points are that some TA is more
susceptible to quantitative analysis than other TA, most TA is susceptible to some type of
quantitative analysis, and that there are a variety of methodological techniques to draw upon with
varying degrees of rigor.  Note also that professional judgement plays a supporting (or "second-
best") role for all types of TA projects.  We also believe that quantitative analysis imposes a
disciplines on the project appraisal process, forcing the professional to think through the
conceptual links of the project as well as the magnitudes to be generated.
11(d): Technical Assistance: Loans versus Grants
The bulk of technical assistance from bilateral donors is in grant form while the exact
opposite is true for the World Bank.  In principle there should be no difference in the evaluation
17of the two - except for perhaps different interest rates - as they both use scarce resources which
could be used elsewhere.  However, from the country perspective they may have quite different
considerations.  Oddly enough, a grant could be more costly than a loan if the seemingly free
nature of the former results in a neglect of domestic opportunity cost variables, including other
uses for the grant.  This danger is particularly relevant when the grant is accepted because there
is some desired capital equipment attached to it but there is little or no commitment to the TA per
se.  In section Ic above a number of other problems of TA grants were discussed, such as hidden
opportunity costs, lack of coordination of numerous grants, and the political economy and rent-
seeking problems that can develop when the recipient ministry or institution is not the one that
bears the opportunity costs.
On the other hand, the refusal by a country of a grant does not necessarily mean that the
rejected funds will be used elsewhere in the country. Projects may be accepted whose funds have
a high opportunity cost from a global perspective but a very low opportunity cost from a
national perspective.  In fact, from the country viewpoint, even a negative rate of return may be
acceptable. The grant, no matter how poorly conceived, may simply be perceived as "better than
nothing".
11(e): Project Screening
We have discussed the problems of quantitative measurement for many TA projects.
Even when feasible such analysis requires resources within the donor institution.  Therefore, it is
recommended that a number of prerequisites are in place even before any quantitative analysis
takes place.
First, if the project is in the public sector, the officer in charge should explain why it
cannot be undertaken by the private sector. In addition to dealing with the general problem of
public versus private sector, this should indirectly partially resolve the problem of path
dependency referred to above. That is, by questioning the very existence of the given public
sector institution (in a form of zero-based budgeting), the analyst helps resolve the question of
whether the institution exists due to historic circumstances which may no longer prevail.
Second, we mentioned above that the most common criticism of TA projects is that there
is no commitment from the recipient.  Without evidence of such commitment we recommend
that the analysis does not continue, unless there is strong reason to believe that an exposition of
the costs and benefits is necessary to obtain recipient support. Particular care needs to be taken
when the TA contains significant capital support (such as computers and vehicles) that the
commitment is to the entire project, particularly but not only when the ministry or institution
which received the TA does not have to repay it.
Third, the officials in charge should also review projects in similar sectors in the recipient
country or similar countries. If there is a consistent record of failure, the analysis should not
continue unless there are new circumstances or provisions which suggest that the current project
will not suffer the same fate as its predecessors.  While it is now becoming common practice to
18undertake such comparisons ("past experience and lessons learned"), there is room for a more
common treatment across the Bank, with a more rigorous methodology when possible.
Fourth, related to the above the Bank should consider the creation of a group of
designated experts within each of the most common categories of projects.  At an early stage in
the project process, approval from a designated expert and someone with local expertise would
be necessary to continue.  In this way the common complaint of the shortage of institutional
expertise would at least be partially resolved.29
Fifth, all components of a project should be conceptualized in economic terms.  If this
cannot be done, it is a strong indication that the objectives of the component (or entire project)
are vague or inconsistent with the tasks to be undertaken.
Sixth, as noted above in projects where a positive appraisal is largely or entirely based on
qualitative professional judgement, an independent expert opinion should be obtained.  Such
experts could be chosen by the institutional experts.
Seventh, training in TA projects has been especially subject to criticism.  It can also be
quite difficult to quantitatively measure its effectiveness. We suggest that the Economic
Development Institute of the World Bank play a stronger role in screening the design of training.
Eighth, it should be demonstrated that TA in an investment loan is essential to its
implementation.  Otherwise, it should not be included unless there are other extraordinary
reasons arguing for its inclusion.
Finally, while tools such as performance or impact indicators cannot replace a thorough
appraisal, an inability to construct concrete measures of performance suggests that objectives
may not be well-defined and there may be problems during implementation.  Therefore, the
current emphasis in the Bank on performance and impact indicators is a positive step in project
development.  Moreover, the economic analysis and performance indicators should be linked as
much as possible.  In particular, key assumptions used in the economic analysis could be tracked
at the same time as the performance indicators in order to provide "early warning signals" on the
quantitative results.  Such data could be fed back into the original economic analysis in order to
determine if there are significant changes in the expected results and if appropriate action should
be taken accordingly.
Part III:  Preliminary Empirical Analysis and Practical Applications
We begin this section with a brief examination of 40 projects from the Eastern Europe
and Central Asia (ECA) Region of the World Bank, with particular emphasis on the amount of
29  The Sector Boards  which are being created  in relation  to the "Networks  for Professional  Excellence,  Staff
Development,  and Client Service," could conceivably  play this role.
19TA and how it was appraised.  Then we look at 4 of these projects in greater depth  and discuss
methodologies which might have been used in the pre-approval appraisal of the TA component. 30
111(a):  Characteristics of the Large Sample
The 40 projects were all in transition economies except for one in Turkey.  One was in
Armenia, 2 in Belarus, 4 in Bulgaria, 5 in Hungary, 3 in Kazakhstan, 5 in Poland, 3-in Romania,
11 in Russia, one in Slovenia, one in Turkey, one in Turkmenistan, one in the Ukraine, and 2 in
Uzbekistan.  Table 2 contains the numbers of loans by type and by year.  In sum there were 2
loans in 1992, 15 in 1993, 13 in 1994, and 10 in 1995. From 1993 to 1995 we included all the
loans for which we calculated more than $US 5 million in TA.  13 of these were technical
assistance loans, 5 were financial intermediary loans, 2 were sectoral adjustment loans, one was a
sector investment/maintenance loan, and 19 were specific investment loans.  Only one of the
loans was the first loan to the country but 13 were one of the first five loans to the country.
The calculation of the amount of TA was often difficult as it was either hard to sort out or
the budget was not broken down sufficiently. Moreover, except in the TA loans, training was
often separated from the rest of TA. For all 40 loans the average size was $US 101 million, of
which $US 24 million was TA.  (The average project size, which includes recipient country and
other agency contributions, was $US 179 million.)  For the 27 non-TA loans the average size was
$US 133 million, of which $US 19 million or 14.3 percent was TA.  The average TA loan was
$US 35 million.
Our original intent was to classify the 40 projects both by type and by methodology used
in the appraisal.  However, in not a single case was a quantitative technique used in the appraisal,
generally without any significant qualitative economic analysis, other than to verify that the
project met the criteria of the country assistance strategy. In fact, with one qualification the only
method used to appraise the TA was professional judgement.  In most of the 1994 and all of the
1995 loans, lessons learned from past Bank experience in the country or similar projects in other
countries were taken into account.  However, there was never an attempt to make an ex-post
quantitative analysis of the other projects reviewed.  In almost all cases the design of the new
project was said to have been adapted to take into account problems in past projects. 3'  In
addition, in all of the 12 non-TA loans for which an economic rate of return was estimated, the
TA portion was excluded from the calculations.
For each of the 40 projects the TA was distributed among the five categories noted in the
last section plus a sixth "other" category when we found it difficult to classify.  Given time
limitations and limited familiarity with the projects, we often had to make "educated guesses" as
to where each type of TA would best fit. Nevertheless, we think that the figures give a good
30  Note that the median loan size was $US 70 million  and project  size was $US 126  million. A few very large
loans and projects  resulted  in substantially  higher averages.
31  As we are only looking  at loans which  were approved,  we did not see any projects  that were rejected  on the
basis of lessons  of past Bank experience. It would  be interesting  to know if this is often the case.
20indication of the types of TA funded by the Bank in ECA. Note that any TA which we deemed
to be necessary for the implementation of an investment project was included in the category
"Investment Project".  Training and studies were allocated to "Investment Project" or
"Institutional Development" if they were an integral part of one or the other.  If neither was the
case, they were categorized as "General Capacity Building".
In the "Institutional Development" sub-category of "Output Permnitting  Evaluation" we
included any activity which would measurably affect a monetary amount. The two most
common examples in our sample were projects in tax administration and institutional
strengthening of commercial banks (including the development of regulatory and supervisory
institutions).  The sub-category "Measurable Output" included any TA which was intended to
affect the delivery of a service or good.  The most common example in our sample was
privatization.  Given the complex nature of privatization in transition economies, it would be
difficult to estimate a rate of return. Nevertheless, the number and (rough) value of enterprises
privatized could be calculated and the cost-effectiveness compared with other countries.  In
addition, the fiscal impact could often be estimated.  The sub-category "Non-Measurable Output"
contained a variety of TA, although it was often connected to more general adjustment measures,
the effects of which would be very difficult to measure.  Much of the TA which fell into this
category was part of one of the first five Bank loans to the recipient country.
In sum, of a total TA of $US 973 million, we classified $US 121 million as "Investment
Project", $US 107 million as "General Capacity Building", $US 266 million as "Institutional
Development  - ", $US 180 million as "Institutional Development - Measurable Output", $US
242 million as "Institutional Development - Non-measurable Output", and $US 57 million as
other.  (See Table 3.)  When we only look at non-TA loans, these figures are (in $US million)
110, 42, 139, 59, 102, and 57, respectively. For TA loans, these figures are (in $US million) 11,
65, 127, 121, 140, and 0, respectively.
Note that we only classified about 20 percent of TA for non-TA loans as necessary for the
implementation of the project.  Therefore, if our classifications are roughly correct, while always
in the same sector or "neighborhood", the vast majority of TA attached to non-TA loans was not
necessary for the success of the core project.  Also, in projects for which an economic rate of
return was calculated, 53 percent of TA was classified as necessary for implementation.  As
noted above, in all such projects the TA was not included in the calculation of the economic rate
of return.
In the next sub-section we will look in more detail at 4 loans.  However, we would like to
note here that if quantitative measures such as cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness, and fiscal
impact can often be used for investment projects and institutional development which permit
valuation and/or measurement, then for about 60 percent of the TA in our sample there was a
strong potential for quantitative analysis. 32
32  This does not mean that there was no potential for quantitative analysis of the other 40 percent.  In particular,
it is likely that a large portion of the general capacity building efforts could have received some quantitative
analysis.
21111(b):  Four Case Studies
In this sub-section we will look in detail at 4 of the 40 projects in our sample.  Two of the
four are TA loans and the other two are specific investment loans.  For the TA loans we chose
one for which it could, a priori, be considered relatively easy to use quantitative analysis
(Hungary Tax Administration Modernization) and one for which it could be considered relatively
difficult (Russian Federation Management and Financial Training, including Russia Tax
Administration).  For one of the specific investment loans an economic rate of return was
calculated but only for the non-TA part (Poland Forest Development Support), while for the
other it was not calculated at all (Russian Federation Financial Institutions Development).
IIIb.i  Hungary Tax Administration Modernization -Loan #36350 (1993)
The size of this TA loan is $US 29m to which the Hungarian govermment  added $US
26.6m for a total project size of $US 55.6m.  The immediate beneficiary and implementing
agency is the Tax and Financial Controls Office (APEH).  The economic rate of return was
deemed not applicable.  The project objective is "to help strengthen tax administration, in line
with the ongoing tax reform, in order to maximize tax revenues in a sustainable way."  (World
Bank, 1993: 2) The three main instruments of the project are:  "(a) institutional development
through the financing of short-term experts to provide advice in tax administration; (b)
development and implementation of a new information technology system, including: (i)
technical assistance to guide the development of a tax applications systems software, to operate
on new computer systems: (ii) mainframe computers for APEH's headquarters and Budapest
branch office, minicomputers and microcomputers for county offices, associated with peripheral
equipment; (iii) software development tools; and (iv) administrative software packages; and (c)
training in development and the use of application systems."  (World Bank, 1993: 2) Note also
that a complementary project undertaken by EC-PHARE will finance training in tax
administration.
There was no quantitative analysis undertaken for this project.  There was a one
paragraph statement of lessons from previous Bank involvement, which mentioned "the need for
a clear focus and limited scope in the project; commitment at all levels; and a sense of ownership
of the project by executing agency staff."  (World Bank, 1993: 4)  No direct reference was made
to the qualitative or quantitative results of other Bank projects in tax administration.
From the documentation that we have seen, the project appears to be a straight forward
attempt to improve the capabilities of the tax administration. 33 Its main objective is to lower the
average and/or marginal cost of tax collection, while its (implicit) secondary objective is to
increase revenue; that is, "fiscal improvement must come from improvements in collection
33 In what follows we will make some suggestions about appraisal methodologies for this specific project,  while
in Box 1 we will discuss the case of tax administration projects more generally.
22achieved through better administration of the tax system."  (World Bank, 1993: 1) There is little
if anything that is extraneous in the loan, in the sense of having a larger purpose than just tax
administration.  It is difficult to estimate a standard economic rate of return for an improvement
of tax administration since one would need to calculate welfare gains of more public goods
and/or a lower fiscal deficit and contrast this with the losses caused by fewer private goods (if the
improvement was revenue increasing).  To complicate matters further, there would likely be
improved horizontal equity (and perhaps vertical equity) in the tax system, increasing the welfare
gains to the administrative reform.  In essence you would need a general equilibrium model,
requiring significant conceptual development and substantial reliable data. Even if the data was
available such models are good tools for reforms which result in equivalent amounts of revenue,
but they are not very suitable when the reform is not expected to be revenue neutral. 34
One could, of course, calculate the expected change in the average (and/or marginal) cost
of tax collection.  Presumably the reform should result in a lower collection cost. 35 In addition,
the expected collection costs for various taxes can be compared with those in other countries.
The one caveat to this argument is that if revenue enhancement is the driving force of the reform,
little change or small increases in collection costs may not be important. However, the second
part of the analysis - cross country comparisons -is still valid.
An alternative or back-up analysis would be the fiscal impact of the reform.  Stabilization
and adjustment in many countries have been threatened by large fiscal imbalances.  If the reforn
is expected to have a strong effect on the fiscal balance, this could be justification enough in a
time of serious macroeconomic imbalances.  First, it would be necessary to estimate the expected
changes in revenues and costs.  Second, if the data was available, it may have been possible to
construct a small macroeconomic model, which could be used to estimate the effect of changes in
the fiscal deficit on inflation and the balance of payments.  Even if the second step was not
possible, the simple conceptualization of the problem in such terms would have been useful.
In sum, it seems possible that fairly inexpensive quantitative analysis could have been
undertaken in the appraisal of this project.  (Of course, if it was decided to build a general
equilibrium model, the costs would not be trivial.)  It may well be that data limitations would
have made even the relatively simple analysis that we have suggested impractical, although for
Hungary and this particular project, this seems unlikely.  (See Box 1 for a further discussion of
the different stages of analysis of tax administration reform.)
IIIb.ii  The Russian Federation Management and Financial Training -Loan #38240 (1995)
and Russia Tax Administration - Loan #38530 (1995)
34  It is also  unlikely  that  a computable  general  equilibrium  model  would  be suitable  to use for a transition
economy  where  large  changes  in economic  structure  are  expected  to occur.
35  In general  changes  in collection  costs  and  welfare  costs  can  be quite  different.  However,  as in this  project
there  is no reform  of the various  types  of taxes,  the  two  costs  should  be quite  similar  for the  revenue  neutral
scenario.
23We have combined these two loans as they were developed to be complementary.  The
loan for the Management and Financial Training (MFTP) Project was $US 40m to which were
added $US 10.3m from Russian sources and $US l.lm  from the Government of Switzerland.
The loan for the Tax Administration Project (TAP) was $US 16.8m to which were added $US
O.9m  from the IMF and $US 9.7m from the Government of Russia.  In both cases the economic
rate of return was deemed not applicable.
The MFTP has 3 principal objectives:  "(i) to train practitioners in three core fields of
management, financial sector, and public finance; (ii) to develop an intermediary institution, the
National Training Foundation, to mobilize and channel resources for high priority training
investments; and (iii) to implement pilot projects in other key market areas and establish the
basis for a broader second-phase investment."  (World Bank, 1  995a: i)  The main elements of the
project are precisely the training needed to meet the above objectives.
The principal objectives of the TAP are:  (i) To modernize tax administration in two
regions; and (ii) to assist in the institutional development of tax administration by building the
capacity of the State Tax Service (the main beneficiary), preparing for nationwide
implementation of tax administration reforms, and providing project management support.  To
achieve these objectives the proposed project would finance expert services, staff training,
acquisition of hardware and software, and minor improvements of offices for computerization.
(World Bank, 1995b: 4)
The tax administration project is very similar to the one discussed above for Hungary;
accordingly, we will only mention that the public finance training in the MFTP is very
complementary. Most of the arguments given in the Hungarian case also apply here, although
given the somewhat more limited scale (due to the size of Russia) it could be difficult to analyze
at the macroeconomic level.  We would also like to note that despite the lack of quantitative
analysis for either project, a significant effort was made to distill and employ lessons from Bank
experience in Russia and similar projects elsewhere.
30 percent of the total costs of the MFTP are for management development; ie reformning
and upgrading enterprise-based management.  A cost-effectiveness analysis could have begun by
determining approximately the number of persons that would be trained and the length of
training and comparing the cost with that of other transition or similar countries (allowing, of
course, for differences in the cost of living and key inputs).  A deeper analysis would have
estimated the increase in the return to human capital of the various participants and calculated
this against the cost of the training.  In effect, this is what a typical university student does in a
western country (although she would usually only be interested in the private return and not the
complete return to society of the education). Of course, the calculations can be difficult if the
recipient of the training does not pay for the training (other than in time).  It can also be very
problematic for short training courses where it is difficult to distinguish the before and after
market value of the recipient, in contrast to a high school versus a university graduate.  Finally,
the data problems could be insuperable in Russia at this time.  Still, it may be possible to
estimate ex-post the return to similar training courses in countries with better data availability
and use these as guidelines.
2445 percent of the total costs of the MFTP are for training in the financial sector, divided
between accountancy, auditing and finance (AAF) versus banking.  In the case of AAF, estimates
were made of the number of persons to be trained at various levels. These could have been
compared with other countries to obtain some idea of cost-effectiveness. As in the case of
management development it is possible that the increased returns to human capital could be
calculated, although the short-term and very widespread nature of the training may have made
this difficult.  Given the greater focus of the banking training in this project, it seems likely that
the success of the project should depend on a higher rate of return of the commercial banks
involved.  Therefore, estimates of the effects on profits of the commercial banks receiving the
training could have been undertaken in the appraisal.
Finally, about 11 percent of the costs of the MFTP are for the creation of a National
Training Foundation.  It could be argued that in the calculations of the costs or rates of return of
any other part of the project, the costs of the National Training Foundation should be pro-rated in
some way.  This would have to be handled with great care given the substantial externalities that
such a foundation could provide for the Russian economy. 36 In fact, the most appropriate
quantitative analysis of the entire project could well have been to undertake a cost-benefit
analysis of the National Training Foundation.
11Jb.iii Poland Forest Development Support -Loan # 36410 (1994)
The loan for the Poland Forest Development Support project was $US 146m to which
were added $US 16m from the European Investment Bank, $US 26.9m from bilateral agencies,
and $US 146.5m from the Government of Poland, for a total project size of $US 335.4m.  The
main beneficiary is the General Directorate of State Forests (GDSF). The economic rate of
return was estimated for the "investment" part of the project (18 percent) but not for the technical
assistance components.
The objectives of the project are: "(i) Assistance in introducing biologically and
environmentally sound management practices in the forestry sector and amelioration of
environmental damage, particularly by increasing the vitality and productivity of Poland's
important forests; (ii) Improvement of the efficiency of forest activities (afforestation,
regeneration and restoration of air pollution damaged forests, silvicultural treatments, and
harvesting); and (iii) Improvements in the organization, management, and financial structure of
the Directorate of State Forests and the Govemment's programs to modemize, restructure, and
privatize elements of the GDSF and the downstream wood industry sector." (World Bank, 1994a:
9)  The seven components of the project are: (i) intensification of silviculture in existing forests;
(ii) restoration of air-pollution damaged forests; (iii) afforestation; (iv) genetic conservation and
36  "The  creation  of a new  training  foundation  was  justified  by the  massive  scale  of training  requirements,  which
exceed  the  scope  of any existing  agency;  the  present  lack  of coordinating  mechanisms;  the need  to involve  non-
govermnent  institutions  and employers  in the process;  the need  to address  regional requirements  flexibly; and the
need for objective  project  selection  and strict financial  controls. The NTF is an autonomous  institution  with  half
government  and half private ownership.  "  (World  Bank, 1995a:  ii)
25improvement program; (v) modernization of harvesting, skidding, and transport equipment; (vi)
ecosystem conservation in national parks; and (vii) institutional development.  An economic rate
of return of 18 percent was calculated for the first five of these categories, which comprise 90
percent of the project expenditure.
Our concern in this paper is whether a quantitative analysis could have been undertaken
for the last two components.  First, we asked whether or not their costs should have been
included in the cost-benefit analysis of the first five components; that is, are the main benefits of
these components their contribution to the success of the more concrete aspects of the project?
In the case of ecosystem conservation in national parks (3.6 percent of total expenditure), the
answer is clearly no.  In essence, this is a separate project with only a very marginal relationship
to the core investment.  It appears as if it was packaged with the other components for
administrative convenience, given the same beneficiary. 37
The institutional development component (6.2 percent of total expenditure) is focused on
the GDSF, the same institution in charge of implementation of the other five components.  It has
seven sub-components:  (i) development of a strategy for environmentally sound forest
utilization; (ii) completion and implementation of a forest management information system; (iii)
office of project implementation; (iv) section for privatization of forestry; (v) divisions of trade
and marketing; (vi) institutional strengthening for GDSF; and (vii) forestry research support to
ensure sufficient scientific support for the transition of the sector to a market economy.  (World
Bank, 1994a: 14)
While it seems quite clear that the success of this component would increase the return to
the five specific investment components, it could be argued that there are significant externalities
associated with this ID package.  If it is to be included on the costs side, these other benefits must
be measured.  However, they would be extremely difficult to measure.  Our bias is that the costs
of ID should be included in the economic evaluation of the investment component.  Some are
essential for implementation - (iii), (iv), and (vi) above - while the others are very important.  As
a final note, cost-effectiveness analysis could have been undertaken for the sub-component on
the forest management information system, half of the ID component.
IIIb.iv  Russian Federation Financial Institutions Development - Loan # 37340 (1994)
The Bank loan for this project was $US 200m to which was added $US 99m from the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a $US 36m grant from the European
Union, $US 37.4m in bilateral grants, $US 3m from the Russian government, and $US 14m by
participating commercial banks.  The total project size is $US 389.4m.  The economic rate of
return was deemed not applicable.
37 In theory the ecosystem  component,  which focuses  on national  parks, could be analyzed  using environmental
valuation  methods,  but given the fledgling  nature  of the program this would  be quite difficult  to undertake.
26The main objective of the project is to strengthen a core group of banks which will:  "(i)
Set higher banking standards and create a dynamic for enhancing the quality of banking activities
in Russia; (ii) Create the basis for a private clearing system operating at the level of the
Federation; and (iii) Qualify as on-lenders of World Bank and other international lines of credit."
(World Bank, 1994b: 17)
"The project will consist of four components:  (i) a commercial banking component,
consisting of institutional strengthening programs and systems modernization and automation
programs for private commercial banks; (ii) a bank regulation and supervision component,
consisting primarily of the development of on-site supervisory capabilities and the provision of
legal assistance for the Central Bank of Russia; (iii) a bank accounting component, which will
support the modernization of accounting standards and practices; and (iv) a Project
Implementation Unit component."  (World Bank, 1994b: 17)
After a few brief remarks we will concentrate on the first component as it is 95 percent of
the total project as well as most of the technical assistance.  Both the second and third
components (1 percent and 2 percent of the total project, respectively) will likely have
widespread repercussions.  While it could be argued that they are necessary for the success of the
first component and thus should be included in the quantitative analysis, it could just as easily be
argued that these components have benefits that extend far beyond those of increasing the
likelihood of success of the first component.  Given the difficulty of measuring these
externalities, it may be better to omit the costs.  The last component - the establishment of a
Project Implementation Unit - should be included in the quantitative analysis of the first
component, assuming such an effort is feasible.
The commercial bank component is divided about 1/3 for institutional strengthening
technical assistance, mostly delivered by twinning, and 2/3 for systems modernization and
automation. Note that the proceeds from the Bank and EBRD was on-lent to participating banks
at a rate on average 2.5 percent above the Ministry of Finance's weighted cost of the two loans.
While a good analysis of the qualitative lessons learned from past experience was used in project
design, there was no attempt at any sort of quantitative analysis. 38
A quantitative analysis could have taken the fairly simple approach in estimating the
expected return to the Ministry of Finance, which is ultimately liable for the loan. Based on past
experience in other transition countries, it might have been possible to establish an expected
default rate.
A preferable approach would have been to look at the expected return to the commercial
banks themselves.  Given that the institutions receiving the "secondary" loans are profit-making
institutions, it could be argued that they would not accept such a loan unless its expected return
was higher than the cost of the loan. However, about 19 percent of the total project is in the form
38  In the 40 loans that we reviewed,  the section  on lessons  from past experience  was one of the strongest  in this
project.
27of grants, suggesting that a more sophisticated analysis was necessary.  The quantitative
experience of other countries could have been used as a basis for estimating the rate of return to
individual banks.
As the TA part of the loan is crucial for its success, it would have to be included in any
quantitative analysis.  In fact, commercial banks are not eligible for a loan for systems
modernization and automation until they successfully go through the ID stage.
Finally, while it is true that there are very large externalities to the development of a
modem commercial banking system, this does not necessarily rule out the use of a rate of return
centered on the more explicit costs and benefits.  All it suggests is that a rate of return less than
normal may be acceptable.  Moreover, the minimum acceptable level is also likely to be
dependent on the expected fiscal impact of the project.
Part IV:  Conclusions and Recommendations
Effective delivery of technical assistance continues to be a challenge, one which is only
likely to increase if TA becomes more and more concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa and the
transition economies in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia.  In this document we
began with a review of the most important criticisms of TA projects.  Then we focused on the
appraisal process.  Our primary objective was to demonstrate the possibility of greater use of
quantitative economic analysis in the appraisal process.  In the last section we looked briefly at
40 ECA projects with significant TA, following this up with four case studies.
Our main conclusion is that there is a wide scope for the greater use of quantitative
methodologies in the analysis of TA projects.  While some of this analysis could be sophisticated
and quite demanding, a large portion could be done using fairly simple techniques.  In the ECA
region we crudely estimated that 60 percent of the TA had a high potential for quantitative
analysis. Moreover, the loans in the case studies all appeared to be good candidates for such,
even though only the Hungary Tax Administration project was selected on that criteria.  We
recommend that all TA be classified according to the methodology suitable for its appraisal and
evaluation.  In cases where little or no quantitative analysis is used, the staff officer should
provide a justification.  In most such cases it will still be possible to conceptualize the problem in
economic terms.  We recommend that this procedure also be followed.
In our analysis we roughly estimated that 80 percent of the TA in investment projects was
not necessary for the implementation of the project.  In the 12 investnent  projects for which an
economic rate of return was calculated in the appraisal, the TA was never included in the
estimate, despite the fact that we classified 53 percent of the TA as necessary for implementation
of these projects.  While essential TA should be included in the calculation of the economic rate
of return, we also recommend that either a strong justification is given for the inclusion of non-
essential TA or it should be omitted from the project.  Our particular concern is that, given the
small portion of the total loan of such TA and its non-essential nature, it will not be given
sufficient attention in project implementation and monitoring.
28We also noted that all projects should be screened on a number of important criteria
before any in-depth (and costly) analysis begins.  In this regard we recommended that for project
development to continue past a preliminary phase, there should be: (i) strong recipient interest
and commitment; (ii) a clear rationale why the project or the implementing agency is in the
public sector whenever that is the case; (iii) in countries or project types with high failure rates,
the staff officer should give strong arguments as to why the new project is a "special case";  (iv)
approval from a designated expert in the Bank, especially in the case of institutional development
projects; (v) review by staff in the Economic Development Institute of the World Bank in the
case of training projects; (vi) external independent expert opinion when no quantitative analysis
is feasible; (vii) strong justification for the inclusion of a TA component in an investmnent
project; and (viii) conceptualization of the project in economic terms and the clear linking of this
framework to performance and impact indicators.  In addition, the renewed emphasis on
accountability within the Bank is particularly important in the case of TA, given its overall less
than average performance.
It was noted in the paper that greater use of (quantitative) economic analysis will likely
increase the staff time of a project.  On the other hand, more transparent screening of projects
along the lines just noted could save considerable time.  While the establishment and
maintenance of a network of institutional networks would require substantial resources, the Bank
has already decided to dedicate resources in this direction through the creation of a number of
new networks of institutional expertise, the first of which is the human development network.
Time of operational staff should be reduced by running project proposals through the designated
experts.
Finally, we would like to conclude with a caveat. Some or many of the observations in
this document may be the result of the naivete of the outsider looking in.  Our last
recommendation is that this study go one step further and discuss with task managers in charge
of project appraisal the reason for the lack of quantitative analysis.
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32BOX 1
Tax Administration Reform: Different Stages of Analysis
1.  Simplest Case: Reduced Administrative Costs
From an analytical point of view the most simple reform of tax administration is one in
which the only goal is to lower the collection costs of an equivalent amnount  of the same taxes
collected from the same taxpayers.  There is not expected to be any change in the tax base; the
taxes will just be collected more efficiently. While such a situation is, of course, quite
unrealistic, it is a convenient starting point for the analysis of the reform of tax administration.
In such cases it may well suffice to calculate the average current collection cost per dollar of
taxes and compare this with the expected collection cost after the reform.  Then the net present
value of the loan can be calculated. That is, the expected savings in collection expenditures are
compared with the cost of the loan, everything appropriately discounted.  This figure should be
an accurate reflection of the welfare gains of the reform.  At the same time the pre- and post-
reform collection costs can be compared with those in similar countries.
There is at least one caveat to the above. If there is substantial unemployment and the
cost-cutting exercise calls for significant layoffs of staff, the cost of supporting the unemployed
persons would reduce the benefits.  This could be a serious concern in a transition country,
especially in the short- and medium-terms.
II.  Widen the Tax Base and Lower Rates
Generally it is expected that part of the reduction of collection costs from improved tax
administration will be due to an improved capture rate.  Consequently, in a revenue neutral
improvement, it is likely that the tax rate would be lowered. Therefore, it is necessary to add to
the above analysis of administrative costs the expected change in welfare from income and
labour market effects as well as improved horizontal equity, (both expected to be positive).  In
principle, to capture all of these changes would require some sort of general equilibrium model,
the limitations of which are briefly discussed in the main text. Nevertheless, a thorough
conceptualization of the problem in general equilibrium terms can be useful in itself, helping to
highlight the indirect implications of the reform. It may often be the case that the analysis
suggests that some of these indirect effects are likely to be very important and further study is
needed.
III.  Increased Revenues
Many administrative reforms, especially in transition economies, also intend to increase
revenues.  (Such reforms may also include the closure of tax loopholes, bringing them to the
frontier of tax policy reform.)  Therefore, the broadening of the net and higher capture rates
would not be compensated by lower tax rates, or at least only partially.  When the reform is not
intended to be approximately revenue neutral, the analysis becomes much more complicated.
While there may not be much emphasis on the lowering of collection costs, the reality is that
33unless there are substantial new net resources being provided to the department of revenue, an
increase in collected revenues can only come via a reduction in collection costs.  Even if there is
a large net increase in resources, it still should be feasible to estimate the expected increase in tax
revenues which is attributable to better administration and the portion which is attributable to
increased resources.  However, it will be necessary to derive a relationship for the marginal cost
of collection.
When the primary or one of the central goals is to increase tax revenue, many of the
benefits are expected to come from a lower fiscal deficit and/or a greater provision of public
goods. While private sector behavior is generally expected to be negative when tax rates are
(implicitly) higher, a tax increase which reduces high macroeconomic instability or increases the
provision of essential public goods from extremely low levels may well have the opposite
response.  In sum, the net benefits from a tax increase demand a careful analysis of a number of
competing factors. It is particularly important to carefully examine the end use of the increased
revenues.  Once again it is beneficial to conceptualize the problem in general equilibrium terms
even if quantification is not possible.  There also exists a large body of literature and experience
on the relationship between fiscal deficits, inflation, and growth which should illuminate the
analysis.
IV.  Tax Policy Reform
The reform of tax administration may be part of overall tax policy reform.  If the latter
includes the introduction or elimination of taxes, there will usually be substantial income
distribution and welfare effects.  Aside from a good general equilibrium analysis, it is worth
emphasizing that the two reforms must be consistent.  In particular, a tax policy reform which
does not take into account the necessary administrative reforms has little chance of success.
V.  Macroeconomic Considerations
As a final remark, we would like to emphasize the importance of macroeconomic
considerations in the analysis of the reform of tax administration.  The analysis is likely to be
more complicated if: (i) the unemployment rate is high (see I above); (ii) the inflation rate is high
(which has implications for special admninistrative  measures); and (iii) income distribution is
highly unequal (welfare implications).  Accordingly, the resources devoted to the appraisal
process should partially depend on the macroeconomic situation of the country in question.
34Appendix 1: Recommendations for Technical Assistance Projects
In Section I.c we have discussed the main criticisms of technical assistance.  The
Handbook on Technical Assistance of the Operations Policy Department of the World Bank has
recommendations for trying to eliminate or minimize many of these.  Below are some of its most
important recommendations:
(i) Commitment: The donor must be involved donor in the design of the project but that is not
always sufficient.  The most important way of obtaining commitment is to undertake an effective
demand assessment of the needs of the recipient.  Note that commitment must also include
guarantees that the recipient will provide the inputs needed to sustain changes once the formal
project ends.
(ii) Objectives: The need for clear objectives is stressed in the Handbook and greatly expanded
on in "Performance Monitoring Indicators". Projects should have clear interim and final outputs,
and a clear relationship between these and the desired development objectives.  Obstacles which
may prevent outputs from becoming outcomes (or impact) should be analyzed as seriously as
those which may prevent inputs from becoming outputs.
(iii) Institutional development: There is a clear need for an institutional development strategy
based on dialogue of the Bank and government officials.  Such a strategy has to include sectoral
ministries along with national ministries, as well as other institutions whose functioning will help
determine how well the economic system works.  (eg judicial system)
(iv) Process:  Great emphasis is put on ID/TA as a process and not a blueprint, as well as the
need for flexibility and a long time horizon. Both the Bank and the recipient must be aware that
the process is a long one and will need the commitment of resources from both sides for a long
time.
(v) Training: While there is little discussion of the pedagogical skills of the trainers, there is
considerable emphasis on improperly designed courses.  There is a need for better identification
of training requirements and then the use of an associate or participatory approach, rather than a
didactic one.
(vi) Long-term versus short-term goals: The trade-offs should be made quite explicit, and they
should be disentangled as much as possible.
(vii) Motivation of civil service: The HandboQk  does not argue for salary supplements except in
exceptional circumstances, such as the more or less total collapse of public service effectiveness.
Emphasis is placed on the reform of the civil service.
(viii) Monitoring and evaluation:  Great emphasis is put on the need for more supervision and
better evaluation; that is, in general insufficient staff time is attached to each project.
(ix) Project management units: These should be used sparingly and cautiously and be transferred
to the main agency at a pace commiserate with its ability to continue the PMU's  operations.
(x) Risk analysis: While there is no explicit section on risk analysis, implicitly it is in the
Handbook in the discussion of institutional assessment and the design of TA operations.
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35We also looked at the manner in which two other organizations - USAID and GTZ -
appraise technical assistance projects.  Our primary interest was to what extent quantitative
methods were used.  Below is a brief summary for each organization.
(a)  USAID
The United States Agency for International Development has recommendations and
procedures for financial and economic analysis of projects.  For financial analysis there is a
distinction made between commercially operated and non-commercially operated activities.
Calculation of the financial rate of return or net present value is recommended for the former and
cost-effectiveness analysis for the latter. Economic analysis goes beyond the financial analysis
by taking into account concepts such as shadow prices and externalities.
In practice, however, financial and economic analysis are used sparingly in the agency. 39
The fundamental criteria for project selection is that it fit in the operating unit's strategic plan
which in turn must fit in the agency's strategic plan.  The heart and soul of the strategic plan are
the strategic objectives. "The strategic objective forms the standard by which the operational
unit is willing to be judged in terms of its performance  .....  A strategic objective must be expressed
in terms of a result or impact, be defined in a manner which permits objective measurement, be
clear and precise and generally include only one objective so that progress can be clearly
measured."  (USAID, 1995: 21)
Monitoring and evaluation in USAID are also centered on the strategic objectives and
related performance indicators.  While financial and economic analysis have not been totally
discarded, the driving force for the staff members is to develop projects with objectives which
are compatible with those in the management plan and then strive to meet these objectives.  In
fact, in the main documents there is only a cursory reference to financial and economic analysis,
which are relegated to appendices.
(b)  GTZ
Project development in the GTZ is based on "Objectives-Oriented Project Planning" or
ZOPP, its German acronym.  Although economic and financial analysis can easily fit into ZOPP,
its emphasis is on a participatory approach to the recognition of problems and their solutions.
"Participation is recognized today as a central quality criterion of development cooperation.
Participation means the active involvement of individuals, social groups and organizations in the
planning and decision-making processes that affect them."  (GTZ, 1996: 8) All projects must be
geared to the needs of specific target groups, who must accept these needs and be involved in
project design.
39  The following  points are based on an interview  with Graham  Kerr in August, 1996, who at that time was the
Deputy Chief of Performance  Measurement  and Evaluation  Division.
36The main features of ZOPP are: (a) The use of planning as a process of clarification,
consensus-building and communication. Top priority is given to communicative aspects of
planning and its process-type character; and (b) The construction of the project planning matrix
with information on development goals, project purpose, impact of project measures, results,
activities, resources, assumptions, and indicators.  The main procedures of ZOPP are: (i)
participation by those affected and all important actors; (ii) iterative procedure, flexible design;
(iii) search for consensus; (iv) transparent analysis and decision-making; and (v) receptiveness to
the use of suitable instruments in the planning process.  (GTZ, 1996: 15-16)
Note that while the ZOPP method can incorporate tools such as quantitative economic
analysis, they are not mandatory.  However, this situation is changing and greater use is likely in
the future.  Thomas Englehardt from the GTZ office in Germany informed me that recently GTZ
adopted a three dimensional approach to the economic analysis of projects.  It includes financial
analysis of target groups and the supporting infrastructure of the project as well as economic and
financial analysis at the national level.  Finally, there has been some attempt to extend the
economic analysis of individual projects to the global level to accommodate environmental
impacts.
37Table  1: A Technical Assistance  Typology*
TYPE OF  Investment  General  ID - Output  ID- Measurable  ID- Non-Measurable
PROJECT  Project  Capacity  Permitting  Output  Output




Analysis  xx  xx  x
Cost-
Effectiveness  x  xx  x  xx
Fiscal Impact  x  x  x  x  x
Previous  Projects  -
Quantitative  x  x  x
Previous  Projects  -




Judgement  x  x  x  x  x
x - Alternative ("second-best") methodology or supportive role;  xx - Best methodology
* - See text for full explanation of categories and grading system.
38Table  2: Distribution  of ECA Technical Assistance Loans
Year  1992  1993  1994  1995  Total
Type
1.  Technical  Assistance  0  3  6  4  13
2.  Financial  Intermediary  2  2  0  1  5
3.  Structural  Adjustment  0  0  0  0  0
4.  Sectoral  Adjustment  0  1  1  0  2
5.  Rehabilitation  0  0  0  0  0
6.  Sector Investment/
Maintenance  0  1  0  0  1
7.  Specific Investment  0  8  6  5  19
Total  2  15  13  10  40
39Table  3: Types of ECA Technical Assistance  Loans ($US m)
Free-Standing  TA  Project  Related  TA  All TA
1. Investment  Project  11  110  121
2.  General  Capacity  Building  65  42  107
3.  Output  Permitting  Valuation  ID  127  139  266
4.  Measurable  Output  ID  121  59  180
5.  Non-measurable  Output  ID  140  102  242
6.  Other  0  57  57
Total  464  509  973
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